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Ideology, Party and Interests in the British
Parliament of 1841–47
CHERYL SCHONHARDT-BAILEY*
Building upon Poole and Rosenthal’s NOMINATE technique and Kalt and Zupan’s residualization approach,
I seek to disentangle the influences of constituency interests, party and ideology on the votes of MPs in the
famous Repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. I argue that while the Conservative party shared a distinct ideology,
it was also a coalition of two interests-based alliances. The non-Peelite Conservatives represented mostly
(protectionist oriented) agricultural districts while the Peelites represented districts with more free trade leaning
interests. Before 1846, Peelites voted according to a general Conservative ideology, but in 1846 an abrupt
change occurred: the pivotal Peelites appear to have eschewed Conservative party unity and their own personal
ideology in favour more of the preferences of their constituents. Repeal appears to have gained passage as these
MPs switched from voting more as trustees to voting more as delegates.
INTRODUCTION
In May of 1846 a British parliament consisting predominantly of landowners decided to
forgo protection for agriculture by repealing the famous Corn Laws. This fundamental
policy shift from protection to unilateral free trade has intrigued political scientists,
historians and economists for a century and a half.1 While Repeal was remarkable for many
reasons, particularly relevant for this article is that it split the Conservative party for a
generation. The Conservatives entered government in 1841 with a strong and (what
appeared to be) unified commitment to protecting agriculture, and yet their leader, Prime
Minister Sir Robert Peel, completely reversed this stance within five years. Some of his
party (dubbed the ‘Peelites’) followed Peel by supporting his Repeal legislation, while the
* Government Department, London School of Economics and Political Science. I am grateful for the comments
received at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 2000, at the
Royal Institute of International Affairs, and from my colleagues at the LSE. In particular, I would like to thank
Andrew Bailey, Anthony Howe, David Lake, Iain McLean, Michael Munger, Robert Pahre, Howard Rosenthal,
Ken Scheve and Eric Uslaner for their helpful suggestions, and Gordon Bannerman for his research assistance.
Special thanks is given to Keith Poole, who generated the coordinates from my data and offered subsequent
assistance. This project benefited from financial assistance from STICERD (LSE). The data used in this article
may be obtained from my personal website at http://personal.lse.ac.uk/SCHONHAR/.
1 P. E. G. Rohrlich, ‘Economic Culture and Foreign Policy: The Cognitive Analysis of Economic Policy
Making’, International Organization, 41 (1987), 61–92; D. A. Lake and S. C. James, ‘The Second Face of
Hegemony: Britain’s Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846’, International
Organization, 43 (1989), 1–29; T. J. McKeown, ‘The Politics of Corn Law Repeal and Theories of Commercial
Policy’, British Journal of Political Science, 19 (1989), 353–80; C. Schonhardt-Bailey, ‘Lessons in Lobbying for
Free Trade in 19th Century Britain: To Concentrate or Not’, American Political Science Review, 85 (1991), 37–58;
I. McLean, ‘Irish Potatoes, Indian Corn, and British Politics: Interests, Ideology, Heresthetics, and the Repeal of
the Corn Laws’, in F. McGillivray, I. McLean, R. Pahre and C. Schonardt-Bailey, eds, International Trade and
Political Institutions (London: Edward Elgar, 2001), pp. 99–145; I. McLean, Rational Choice and British Politics:
An Analysis of Rhetoric and Manipulation from Peel to Blair (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); R. Pahre,
‘British Hegemony and the Repeal of the Corn Laws’, in C. Schonhardt-Bailey, ed., The Rise of Free Trade
(London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 481–502; D. Verdier, ‘Between Party and Faction: The Politics Behind the Repeal
of the Corn Laws’, in Schonhardt-Bailey, ed., Rise of Free Trade, pp. 309–38.
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rest remained firmly committed to protecting agriculture. Within a month of gaining
passage of Repeal, the Peel government fell2 and the Conservatives remained divided and
for the most part out of office for decades to come. Historians have long debated why the
Peelites reversed their stance on the defining issue of this parliament, and the extent to
which the Conservative party was divided prior to Peel’s motion to repeal the Corn Laws,
without finding definitive answers.3 The puzzle of the Peelites is important to political
scientists because it raises the fundamental question of what motivates legislators – and
especially, what motivates them to reverse their position on a crucial policy issue? At least
three literatures lend insights into this question.
Modes of Representation
Studies of political representation have for many years contrasted the ‘delegate’ and
‘trustee’ roles of legislators. Delegates are said to represent the interests (normally
economic) of their constituents,4 whereas trustees represent what they deem to be the
national or wider public interest.5 Painted in stark contrast, delegates are motivated entirely
by the interests of their constituents, while trustees are motivated entirely by their own
ideological predisposition. Yet, as some empirical analyses of roll-call votes attest, the
reality is not so simple – indeed, legislative behaviour is the combination of constituency
preferences and legislators’ ideology.6 The controversy rests in the methodology used to
disentangle interests and ideology, and the interpretation given to legislator ‘ideology’.
Some maintain that once constituency interests have been properly measured, deviations
in voting patterns reflect legislators’ ideology, which can be interpreted as ‘shirking’.7
Others criticize this interpretation of ideology as synonymous with shirking (however
measured), preferring to describe it as ‘reputational capital’ or a brand name which voters
2 While Peel carried the repeal legislation in June 1846, he was defeated shortly thereafter on a coercion bill
for Ireland, and resigned as prime minister. The real reason for his defeat was the Corn Laws, as opposition to
the coercion bill was the act of retaliation against Peel from the protectionists. In July 1846 Lord Russell formed
a Whig administration (in which Whigs, Radicals and Irish were in a minority) which lasted until the general
election of 1847, after which the Whigs returned to govern with increased members.
3 N. Gash, ‘Peel and the Party System, 1830–50’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th ser., 1 (1951),
47–69; R. Stewart, The Politics of Protection: Lord Derby and the Protectionist Party, 1841–1852 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1971); W. O. Aydelotte, ‘The Distintegration of the Conservative Party in the 1840s:
A Study of Political Attitudes’, in W. O. Aydelotte, A. G. Bague and R. W. Fogel, eds, The Dimensions of
Quantitative Research in History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 319–46; J. B. Conacher,
The Peelites and the Party System, 1846–52 (Newton Abbot, Devon: David & Charles, 1972); W. D. Jones and
A. B. Erickson, The Peelites, 1846–1857 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1972); R. Blake, The
Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill (London: Fontana/Collins, 1974).
4 D. Mayhew, Congress, The Electoral Connection (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974).
5 R. L. Hill, Toryism and the People, 1832–1846 (London: Constable, 1929); H. Eulau, ‘The Legislator as
Representative: Representational Roles’, in J. C. Wahlke, H. Eulau, W. Buchanan and L. C. Ferguson, eds, The
Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962), pp. 267–86; R. H. Davidson, The Role of the Congressman
(New York: Pegasus, 1969); E. Uslaner, The Movers and the Shirkers: Representatives and Ideologues in the
Senate (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999).
6 L. E. Richardson and M. C. Munger, ‘Shirking, Representation, and Congressional Behavior: Voting on the
1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act’, Public Choice, 67 (1990), 11–34.
7 S. Peltzman, ‘Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting’, Journal of Law and Economics, 27 (1984),
181–210; J. P. Kalt and M. A. Zupan, ‘The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for
Principal–Agent Slack in Political Institutions’, Journal of Law & Economics, 33 (1990), 103–31: D. A. Irwin
and R. S. Kroszner, ‘Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy Change: The Republican Conversion
to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawley’, Journal of Law and Economics, 42 (1999), 643–73.
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use to assess and discipline their representatives.8 A third group maintains that even if the
economic interests of constituents could be perfectly measured, such models of legislative
voting behaviour would fail to capture accurately roll-call voting because they ignore
logrolling behaviour which serves to package these interests into structured (which may
be deemed ‘ideological’) patterns of voting.9
In spite of the difficulties identified by these and other authors,10 this article attempts
to gauge the relative weights of constituency preferences and MPs’ personal ideology in
the critical votes leading up to and including the Repeal of the Corn Laws in
nineteenth-century Britain. While the findings are interpreted with caution, I conclude that
an abrupt change occurred in 1846: MPs – and particularly the pivotal MPs – appear to
have eschewed ideology in favour more of the preferences of their constituents. Repeal
appears to have gained passage as some MPs switched from voting more as trustees to
voting more as delegates.
Roll-Call Voting in the 1841–47 Parliament
Within the vast multidisciplinary literature on Repeal is a subset of researchers11 who have
attempted to dissect the respective influences of ideology and constituency interests on the
votes of MPs in the 1841–47 Parliament. Most of these authors have drawn upon
Aydelotte’s pioneering data which sampled the roll-call votes of the 1841–47 Parliament.12
Their work has sought, in part, to resolve a dispute between proponents of ideological
explanations for Repeal13 and proponents of interests-based explanations.14 The former
8 W. R. Dougan and M. C. Munger, ‘The Rationality of Ideology’, Journal of Law & Economics, 32 (1989),
119–42; Richardson and Munger, ‘Shirking, Representation and Congressional Behavior’; D. Coates and M.
Munger, ‘Legislative Voting and the Economic Theory of Politics’, Southern Economic Journal, 61 (1995),
861–73.
9 K. T. Poole and H. Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997).
10 J. E. Jackson and J. W. Kingdon, ‘Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes’, American Journal
of Political Science, 36 (1992), 805–23.
11 G. W. Cox, The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); McKeown, ‘The Politics of Corn Law Repeal’; C.
Schonhardt-Bailey, ‘Specific Factors, Capital Markets, Portfolio Diversification, and Free Trade: Domestic
Determinants of the Repeal of the Corn Laws’, World Politics, 43 (1991), 545–69; C. Schonhardt-Bailey, ‘Linking
Constituency Interests to Legislative Voting Behavior: The Role of District Economic and Electoral Composition
in the Repeal of the Corn Laws’, Parliamentary History, 13 (1994), 86–118; I. McLean, ‘Interests and Ideology
in the United Kingdom Parliament of 1841–7’, in J. Lovenduski and J. Stanyer, eds, Contemporary Political
Studies 1995, Vol. 1 (Belfast: Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom, 1995), pp. 1–20; I. McLean,
‘Railway Regulation as a Test-bed of Rational Choice’, in K. Dowding and D. King, Preferences, Institutions and
Rational Choice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 134–61; McLean, ‘Irish Potatoes, Indian Corn’; Verdier,
‘Between Party and Faction’.
12 Of the 1,029 divisions that occurred during the lifetime of this parliament, Aydelotte sampled 186, or 18
per cent. Aydelotte biased his sample towards those divisions that were relatively well attended (i.e., in which
200 or more men participated) and were, in Aydelotte’s judgement, important and relevant to key problems of
the day (W. O. Aydelotte, ‘British House of Commons, 1841–1847’ (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research, n.d.)).
13 C. Kindleberger, ‘The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe, 1820–1875’, Journal of Economic History,
35 (1975), 20–55; Rohrlich, ‘Economic Culture and Foreign Policy’; B. Hilton, The Age of Atonement (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1988); McLean, ‘Interests and Ideology’.
14 J. A. Thomas, The House of Commons 1832–1901: A Study of its Economic and Functional Character
(Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1939); W. R. Brock, Lord Liverpool and Liberal Toryism (London: Frank
Cass, 1941); G. M. Anderson and R. D. Tollison, ‘Ideology, Interest Groups, and the Repeal of the Corn Laws’,
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 141 (1985), 197–212; Schonhardt-Bailey, ‘Linking
Constituency Interests’.
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emphasize the loyalties and allegiances of MPs to the constitution, religion and/or political
party, or their conversion to Manchester School liberal ideology (i.e., MPs as trustees),
while the latter maintain that Repeal-minded MPs acted as conduits for free-trade interests
that were created from industrialization (i.e., MPs as delegates).15
The answers that Cox, McKeown, Schonhardt-Bailey, McLean and Verdier give to the
question of the sudden shift to Repeal in 1846 provide some of the building blocks for the
present analysis. Cox’s analysis of Aydelotte’s data provides ample justification for an
electoral connection in 1841–47,16 although it does not investigate Repeal per se (nor is
this the intent of his work). Inasmuch as he offers an explanation for Repeal, it rests on
the presumed ‘independence’ of the Peelites.17 Some historians have argued that the
Peelites represented the epitome of independence from party and constituents’ interests –
in a nutshell, the ultimate trustees.18 Cox’s empirical support for this hypothesis is limited
to the absence of a link between constituency influence and votes of Conservative MPs,
but the existence of one for Liberal MPs.19 His findings, unfortunately, do not distinguish
between Peelite and non-Peelite Conservatives and so he provides no empirical support
for the independence hypothesis.
McKeown, in contrast, focuses on the Repeal votes and finds that economic interests
constrained the votes of MPs – though he maintains that the pace of changes in interests
could not have been swift enough to cause the abrupt shift to Repeal. He attributes the shift
to the Irish Repealers (who sought the repeal of the union in Ireland) and the Peelites, who
converted not from any change in economic circumstances, but ‘for their own reasons’.20
Repeal thus becomes a peculiarity of British history. While McKeown’s model also tests
the effect of party affiliation on MPs’ votes, he never integrates party and economic
interests into a single model. Schonhardt-Bailey integrates party affiliation and
constituency interests into a single model in which party affiliation is largely (though not
entirely) an intervening variable between changes in constituency interests and MPs’ votes.
The shift to Repeal is said to hinge upon key changes in economic interests – namely, the
diversification of landowners’ portfolios to include more export-oriented interests and the
geographic spread of export-oriented interests throughout Britain. Neither McKeown nor
Schonhardt-Bailey, however, attempt to incorporate ideological motivations into their
models.
McLean is concerned primarily with Peel’s pivotal role in the Repeal process, and
maintains that the Irish potato famine sparked the abrupt shift in Peel’s change of mind.
He argues that by merging the issue of famine relief with that of Repeal, Peel transformed
the single dimension of Repeal to one of multidimensionality. He tests his multidimension-
ality argument on the votes of parliamentarians. He merges Aydelotte’s and Schonhardt-
Bailey’s datasets, adding to it new measures for MPs’ and constituency ideology (defined,
for the most part, in terms of religious beliefs). He then focuses on just the Conservative
votes on Repeal in an attempt to dissect the respective influences of interests (both personal
15 Proponents of both the trustee and delegate interpretations can find ample evidence in historical documents
for their arguments (see author’s personal website).
16 Cox, The Efficient Secret, pp. 148–65.
17 Cox, The Efficient Secret, p. 21.
18 The concluding sentence from Jones and Erikson (which Cox also cites) summarizes this independence: ‘For
if there was one attitude that the Peelites popularized and made fashionable, it was that even the most mute
back-bencher, when it came to a division, had a duty to vote his conscience and his sense of honor’ (Jones and
Erikson, The Peelites, p. 223.)
19 Cox, The Efficient Secret, p. 159.
20 McKeown, ‘The Politics of Corn Law Repeal,’ p. 378.
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and constituency) and ideology (again, personal and constituency) on votes. His
best-performing model for English Conservative MPs fails to account for the votes of
fifty-five Peelites and twenty-seven non-Peelite Conservatives on the final reading of
Repeal. He concludes that while both economic interests and ideology affected the votes
on Repeal, ideology mattered more.
Finally, Verdier focuses on why Peel chose to endorse Repeal and so is less concerned
with the decisions of other MPs. However, inasmuch as his ‘political model’ characterizes
the Conservative party as internally divided between frontbenchers (who sought party
aims) and backbenchers (who were motivated more by constituency pressures), he
implicitly models the voting decisions of Conservative MPs. Drawing both from
Aydelotte’s and McKeown’s data, he finds more support for a political model than an
economic one. Similar to the analysis of this article, he detects an internal divide within
the Conservative party that spanned issues other than Repeal and existed prior to 1846.
While he chooses to characterize this divide as frontbench versus backbench, he notes that
the minority of Conservative backbenchers who supported Peel were generally from large,
urban boroughs and faced serious contests from Liberal challengers. This coincides with
this article’s depiction of Peelites as representing more free-trade leaning districts, with
the rationale that Peelites were also more sensitive to electoral pressures than were
non-Peelites. Yet, his work is limited in that he offers no measure for ideology; the
empirical analysis (like McLean’s) is limited to Conservative MPs; he applies an
inappropriate model (ordinary least squares) to measure roll-call votes; and he obtains
rather poor results (e.g., r2 values ranging from 0.24 to 0.37).
As this brief survey reveals, no researcher of Repeal has yet attempted to analyse
the combined effects of interests, party affiliation and MPs’ personal ideology in a
single model for both Liberal and Conservative MPs. Hence, while most agree that all
these factors contributed to Repeal, theory has been limited by the empirical analysis.
Moreover, no attempt has been made to place such an analysis of Repeal into the broader
context of roll-call votes on other issues in the 1841–47 Parliament, and so any discussion
of the dimensionality of this parliament, or of Repeal itself, has been constrained. And,
finally, the empirical success of the models of these researchers has been limited at
best.
This article seeks to advance the understanding of parliamentary voting in the 1840s in
three ways. First, by applying Poole and Rosenthal’s NOMINATE technique,21 I improve
upon Aydelotte’s analysis of the underlying orientations of opinion (or dimensions) that
divided MPs. Using Guttman scaling analysis, Aydelotte found that a single scale (dubbed
the ‘Big Scale’) captured voting patterns in 120 of the 186 divisions sampled. Within this
sub-set of 120, the single scale could then classify according to their votes 95 per cent of
the 815 members. With NOMINATE, I find that one dimension classifies 89.5 per cent
of the votes in all 186 divisions, and two dimensions classify 92.04 per cent of the votes.22
Thus scaling techniques that rely on both deterministic and probabilistic models find a
highly structured voting pattern (or low dimensionality) for this parliament, meaning that
decisions on each roll call can be linked to decisions on other roll-call votes. While this
21 K. T. Poole and H. Rosenthal, ‘Patterns of Congressional Voting’, American Journal of Political Science,
35 (1991), 228–78; Poole and Rosenthal, Congress.
22 Another way to evaluate the fit of their model is to see how much NOMINATE improves on a benchmark
model by estimating the proportional reduction in error (PRE) of NOMINATE over the benchmark (Poole and
Rosenthal, Congress, p. 30). Here, the aggregate proportional reduction in error (APRE) for the first dimension
is 0.692, and for the second dimension is 0.753.
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structure is an abstraction, I argue that it provides a crude representation of the ideological
positions of MPs.23 I then attempt to refine this measure of ideology by adapting a version
of Kalt and Zupan’s ‘residualization approach’,24 thereby dividing the NOMINATE scores
into three components – party, constituency interests and a residual. The residual is argued
to constitute an improved measure of MP ideology.
Secondly, I analyse the votes on, and leading up to, Repeal, using party, interests and
ideology, and with this model I am able to account for 97 to 99 per cent of the votes.
Thirdly, my findings call into question the presumed ‘independence’ of the Peelites as
they voted for Repeal. Indeed I show just the opposite – in so far as Peelites voted as
trustees, they did so only up to 1846. Their conversion to Repeal did not demonstrate their
commitment to beliefs independent of their constituents; rather, their conversion reflected
a departure from voting more as trustees to voting more as delegates.
When Ideology Matters Less
Political scientists in a variety of subdisciplines have sought to establish the importance
of ideas and ideology as causal factors in policy making.25 The goal of much of this
literature is to specify the conditions under which ideas or ideology become relevant for
policy making. Often the supposition is that interests form the core of behavioural
motivation, but that ideology can sometimes intersect with, or override this motivation.
The interesting twist offered by this article is that I show how ideology was dissipated as
a causal force, to be replaced in part by constituents’ interests. Rather than identifying
where ideology mattered, I demonstrate where ideology came to matter less in a crucial
policy shift.
THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF
As the title of this article suggests, ideology, partisanship and constituency interests all
most likely played a role in the progression to Repeal; however, the aim of this article is
to disentangle these three causal factors in order to assess their relative importance in the
final decision. I argue that while the Conservative party shared a distinct ideology – namely,
23 Dimensions in roll-call votes are essentially abstractions that capture the structure of voting across a wide
set of topics. Low dimensionality (particularly relative to the range of issues) can suggest a greater role for ideology.
If, for instance, a high percentage of votes can be correctly classified with just one dimension, it is likely that a
single left–right (liberal–conservative) ideological continuum is a good predictor of the votes. Further dimensions
may capture other ideological divisions or may reflect cleavages in interests. Moreover, while an ideological
dimension may reflect party loyalties, party may comprise just one element of this dimension. Hence, ideology
and party are not necessarily synonymous.
24 Kalt and Zupan, ‘The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators’.
25 A few examples include P. A. Hall, ed., The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989); J. Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); J. Goldstein and R. O. Keohane, eds, Ideas and Foreign Policy:
Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); A. S. Yee, ‘The Causal
Effect of Ideas on Policies’, International Organization, 50 (1996), 69–108; D.W. Drezner, ‘Ideas, Bureaucratic
Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy’, American Journal of Political Science, 44 (2000), 733–49; J. W.
Legro, ‘The Transformation of Policy Ideas’, American Journal of Political Science, 44 (2000), 419–32; K.
Nakano, ‘The Role of Ideology and Elite Networks in the Decentralisation Reforms in 1980s France’, West
European Politics, 23 (2000), 97–114; J. I. Walsh, ‘When Do Ideas Matter? Explaining the Successes and Failures
of Thatcherite Ideas’, Comparative Political Studies, 33 (2000), 483–516.
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the defence of traditional British institutions such as the monarchy and the Protestant
Establishment (including its property and privileges) – it was also a coalition of two
interests-based alliances. One faction was the non-Peelite Conservatives, who voted to
retain protection. The vast majority of these MPs represented highly rural and agricultural
districts. The other faction was the Peelite Conservatives, who voted with Peel’s motion
for Repeal. Peelites represented districts with both agricultural interests and industry
interests, though tending towards protectionism relative to the opposition Liberals. Hence
the non-Peelite Conservatives represented districts with ‘hard core’ protectionist interests,
while the Peelites represented districts with ‘soft core’ protectionist interests, wavering on
free trade. Yet from 1841 to 1845, the Peelites voted with their Conservative colleagues
to retain protection, with the aim of preserving Conservative party unity, and thereby,
traditional British institutions – even though this conflicted with their representation of
evolving free-trade interests. For Peelites, ideology and constituency interests were more
likely to conflict, whereas for non-Peelite Conservatives, they were more likely to coincide.
In 1846, Peel’s introduction of the Repeal legislation shattered the ideology that was the
glue of the Conservative party, leaving both factions to vote more according to the interests
of their constituents.
To disentangle ideology, party affiliation and constituency interests, I employ a number
of methodologies, but most notably Poole and Rosenthal’s NOMINATE technique and
Kalt and Zupan’s ‘residualization approach’. The intent is not to position ideology, party
and interests in competing roles, but rather to estimate the contribution of these causal
factors to the voting behaviour of parliamentarians as they approached the ultimate
decision that in effect ended Peel’s government. NOMINATE scores serve as a first
cut into measuring MP ‘ideology’, while an adapted version of the Kalt and Zupan
method is used to divide this measure into three contributing components – party,
constituency interests and a residual which is argued to be a proxy measure of MP personal
ideology.
The next section outlines the methodology that generates the measure of MPs’ ideology
as used in this article. The following section applies the NOMINATE technique to
the 1841–47 Parliament, and discusses how the NOMINATE coordinates intersect
with party groups and constituency interests. The section after that dissects the first
dimension coordinate into party, constituency interests and MPs’ ideology in order to
(a) gauge the extent to which MPs voted as delegates or trustees in the repeal votes;
and (b) present a rationale, based on empirical analysis, for the Peelites abruptly shifting
their position from protection to free trade, thereby ensuring the passage of Repeal in 1846.
The penultimate section explores the relevance of commonly used interpretations of
ideology – that is, shirking and reputation-building – for the case of Repeal. A conclusion
follows.
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO MEASURING IDEOLOGY, PARTY AND
INTERESTS
Ideology is notoriously difficult to measure, and even more so when the political actors
under scrutiny are in the domain of history. Yet because ideology lies at the heart of the
puzzle of the Peelites, some measurement is required. This article draws upon two
recognized approaches for measuring legislators’ ideology. Neither method is, however,
faultless.
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NOMINATE
Poole and Rosenthal’s NOMINATE technique is said to improve upon alternative methods
of analysing roll-call voting, such as factor analysis and multi-dimensional scaling.26 It has,
however, received some criticism.27 While Poole and Rosenthal have addressed some of
these concerns,28 others remain unresolved. Hence, NOMINATE’s finding of low
dimensionality for the 1841–47 Parliament should be treated with some caution. None the
less, it is also fair to say that as the cruder (but more transparent) Guttman scaling technique
also revealed low dimensionality, outright scepticism is probably unwarranted.29
An analysis of dimensionality serves two fundamental purposes for this study. First, the
primary dimension obtained from NOMINATE provides a crude measurement for MPs’
ideology, which can then be dissected using the Kalt and Zupan method. Secondly, by
knowing the structure of the overall voting pattern, we can evaluate the extent to which
the ultimate repeal vote deviated from this structure.
Kalt and Zupan Method
Kalt and Zupan have developed a technique for measuring the influence of ideology,
particularly as distinct from constituency interests. Using a principal–agent perspective,
the authors maintain that legislators who vote according to their ideology ‘shirk’ by failing
to meet their obligations as agents of their principals (constituents/voters).
I adopt the basic Kalt and Zupan approach, but adapt it in a way that attempts both to
address some of the criticisms levelled against the authors for including legislators’ party
affiliation as a predictor,30 and produce discrete measures for interests, party and MP
personal ideology. Specifically, I substitute the first dimension coordinates from
NOMINATE for the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) rating, and then include
four variables to measure constituency interests,31
NOMINATE coordinate 1 f (constituents’ interests) error1. (1)
This produces a fitted value, which I call constituency interests, and a residual value
(error1). The former can be thought of as that portion of the first dimension coordinate that
is accounted for by constituency interests, while error1 retains elements of both MP
ideology and party affiliation. Unlike Kalt and Zupan, I do not include the legislator’s party
affiliation in this first equation. Rather, I introduce MP party affiliation as a predictor of
error1 in a second regression,
26 Poole and Rosenthal, Congress, pp. 51–7; E. Voeten, ‘Clashes in the Assembly’, International Organization,
54 (2000), 185–215.
27 K. Koford, ‘Dimensions in Congressional Voting’, American Political Science Review, 83 (1989), 949–62;
C.Wilcox and A. Clausen, ‘The Dimensionality of Roll-Call Voting Reconsidered’, Legislative Studies Quarterly,
16 (1991), 393–406; Jackson and Kingdon, ‘Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes’; J. M. Snyder,
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error1 f (MP party affiliation) error2. (2)
Equation 2 produces a fitted value for party and a residual value (error2). Party can be
thought of as that portion of the first dimension that is accounted for by MPs’ party
affiliation. At the same time, however, MPs’ party affiliation also reflects the partisan
preferences of constituents. And so, at the parliamentary level, this variable captures MP
party affiliation, but at the constituency level, it serves as a proxy for the partisanship of
constituents.32 Error2 is, by definition, that portion of the first dimension coordinate that
we cannot explain by interests and party affiliation but, by interpretation, it is a measure
of MPs’ ideology. Having stripped the first dimension coordinate of its interests and party
components, we obtain a measure of MPs’ ideology that is not simply a summary statistic
for policy issue positions. This measure is not, however, unproblematic, as I discuss later.
APPLYING NOMINATE TO THE PARLIAMENT OF 1841–47
Because the focus of this article is on one parliament, I use a static NOMINATE model
rather than a dynamic one, and so legislators are assumed to have fixed coordinates. The
roll-call votes used here include all of the divisions from the original Aydelotte dataset.
However, as data on the economic composition of constituencies are not available for
Scotland, Wales and Ireland, only English MPs (who cast at least twenty-five votes)33 are
included in the analysis. These limitations reduce the available number of cases from 590
to 483 MPs.34
As one dimension classifies almost 90 per cent of the votes (with a second dimension
adding only marginal improvement), the analysis of this article focuses on the first
dimension. The first dimension coordinates obtained from NOMINATE appear to reflect
well the revealed preferences of MPs on the major issue that divided the parliament, free
trade or protection.35 The first dimension correctly classifies approximately 98 per cent of
the votes in motions for Repeal in the years leading up to 1846, with about seven errors
for each vote.36 This success declines somewhat for the critical vote in 1846, where 95.8
per cent of the votes are correctly classified, the PRE is 0.905, and the errors climb to
32 Overall partisanship by electors declined markedly from 1841 to 1847. An analysis of split votes (where
electors in double-member districts split their votes between the two major parties, voting both for a Conservative
and for a Liberal) and non-partisan plumping rates (where electors used only one of their two votes for a candidate
when a candidate of the same party was available) reveals that the 1841 election was far more partisan than was
the 1847 election (Cox, The Efficient Secret).
33 The program used to generate the NOMINATE scores includes only those legislators who cast at least
twenty-five votes.
34 Owing to the considerable turnover in MPs during 1841–47, the Aydelotte dataset contains 815 MPs (i.e.,
the total number of MPs who sat at some point during the life of the parliament), while only 658 MPs sat in
parliament at any one time (and only 656 after the disfranchisement of Sudbury in 1844). Hence the 590 English
MPs (reduced to 483 after deducting those who failed to cast at least twenty-five votes) include members who
sat for a short period and ones who sat for the entire parliament.
35 A rank order list of MPs by the first dimension coordinates provides some support for trade policy as the
underlying force to the first dimension: the three leading free traders – Richard Cobden, John Bright and Charles
Villiers, who consistently voted for free trade – are at the top of the list, with Cobden in the lead. Conversely,
protectionist MPs are at the bottom.
36 Four critical motions for repeal are analysed, all of which reflected annual attempts by Charles Villiers, MP,
to repeal the Corn Laws. The dates for these motions are 11 July 1842; 15 May 1843; 26 June 1844; and 10 June
1845. The percentage of votes correctly classified, PRE and errors for each division, are: 1842 – 97.5 per cent,
0.963 (7 errors); 1843 – 97.9 per cent, 0.972 (8 errors); 1844 – 98.0 per cent, 0.972 (7 errors); and 1845 – 98.3
per cent, 0.975 (5 errors).
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seventeen.37 In fact, the classification success of both dimensions falls somewhat over the
course of the parliament, but particularly in 1846 and 1847.38 It is plausible that a new
policy issue (not captured by NOMINATE) began to replace trade policy. A study of voting
patterns after 1847 could better resolve this uncertainty, as it would provide a longer time
frame for gauging the dimensionality of roll-call votes. However, inasmuch as research
has shown that party discipline was low in parliament and the constituencies from Repeal
until the late 1850s,39 any new issue dimension that could have replaced trade policy as
the fundamental conflict would have done so in a period when party structure had shattered
(particularly 1846–47). Moreover, the history of British politics offers no clear view as to
what might have constituted a single underlying orientation of opinion (other than trade
policy) at the time of Repeal and its immediate aftermath.
An analysis of the overlap of the first dimension with party affiliation reveals more.
Roughly speaking, the parties split on the question of free trade, with the majority of
Liberals favouring free trade and – at least until the intra-party split in 1846 – the vast
majority of the Conservatives favouring protection. Hence, a simple density plot of the
coordinates of MPs for the first dimension should reflect a Liberal cluster and a
Conservative cluster. Figure 1 confirms this expectation, as a clear gap separates the
Conservatives from the Liberals, thereby illustrating the overlap between party affiliation
positions on trade policy and the first dimension.
A more refined party breakdown lends further support to this interpretation. Figure 2
shows a density plot of the spatial positions of MPs, but with a four-party classification
– non-Peelite Conservatives, Peelite Conservatives, Whigs/Liberals, and Reformers.40
Fig. 1. Two-party distribution within NOMINATE’s first dimension coordinate
37 While their procedure allows the analysis of individual roll-call votes, Poole and Rosenthal note that their
estimates of roll-call outcomes are less reliable than are their estimates for the spatial locations of legislators or
the cutting lines. Hence, certain roll calls will exhibit a large number of misclassified votes while others will have
few or no errors.
38 There appears to be a decline in the classification success of both the one-dimensional and two-dimensional
models over the course of the parliament. For further discussion, see author’s personal website.
39 Cox, The Efficient Secret.
40 This classification is from Aydelotte.
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Fig. 2. Major party groupings within NOMINATE’s first dimension coordinate
Along the first dimension, MPs divide into these four clusters: non-Peelite Conservatives,
Peelite Conservatives, Whigs/Liberals and Reformers (the mean of the first dimension for
each of these, respectively, is 0.032, 0.249, 0.712 and 0.788).41 Non-Peelite
Conservatives are less tightly clustered (that is, they occupy more issue space) than any
of the other three party categories. The Peelites are, in contrast, more tightly clustered with
only a very slight positive skew, meaning that they occupied less issue space than the
non-Peelite Conservatives. The first dimension coordinates of Liberals and Reformers are
fairly evenly distributed, but – as expected – clustered near to the free-trade end of the
spectrum.
The distinct spike in the Peelite distribution supports the contention that the Peelites
thought about issues differently from non-Peelite Conservatives – and that they did so well
before 1846.42 Yet, the possibility remains that this distribution may instead be capturing
a tautology. That is, the first dimension may simply be capturing MPs’ votes in May 1846,
and so the Peelites were distinct because they voted distinctly in 1846. Aydelotte’s original
Guttman scales can be used to test whether the Peelites and non-Peelite Conservatives
exhibited distinct voting patterns on roll calls that were unrelated to Repeal. A two-tailed
simple t-test for equality of means reveals that the scores of Peelites were indeed
significantly different from those of non-Peelite Conservatives on sixteen out of the
nineteen scales that were unrelated to Repeal.43 Moreover, the same test applied to
41 Further investigation reveals that the content of the second dimension is the conflict over factory legislation
(see author’s personal website).
42 A two-tailed t-test for equality of means for the Peelites and non-Peelites indicates that the difference is
significant at the 1 per cent level.
43 Not included in the total of nineteen are the Corn Laws scale, the Big Scale and the Conservative Party scale
(for which, differences in the means of the two groups are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level). Differences
in the means for the two groups in the Landed Interest, Religion, and Enlarged Canada Wheat scales are all
statistically insignificant. Differences in the means for the Working Class Distress scale are significant at 5 per
cent, while those for the remaining fifteen scales are significant at the 1 per cent level.
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McLean’s revised version of seven of these scales44 shows that the differences between
the two groups are, again, statistically significant.45
Figure 2 can be supplemented with contingency tables of constituency types and party
affiliation to underscore the notion of parties as coalitions of interests-based alliances.
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate that the Conservative party was forged from two alliances of
economic interests.46 The strident protectionists (non-Peelites) represented mostly
agricultural districts with protectionist interests, while the moderate protectionists
(Peelites) represented a mixture of agricultural and industry-oriented districts. From
Table 1, it is clear that the Peelites, Whigs/Liberals and Reformers were all predominantly
from boroughs while the non-Peelites were evenly split between county and borough
districts. As this split depicts a rural/urban divide, Peelites were more likely to represent
free-trade leaning interests than were non-Peelites. Table 2 lists districts according to their
economic orientation, from ‘most protectionist’ to ‘most free trade’. Once again, the
vast majority of Peelites represented ‘protectionist oriented’ or ‘neutral’ districts (very
similar to those represented by the free-trading Liberals and Reformers), while the vast
majority of non-Peelites represented the ‘most protectionist’ and ‘protectionist oriented’
districts.
This configuration is consistent with the argument that the Peelites supported their
fellow Conservatives as long as what was at stake was the long-term interest of party
unity.47 Protection, therefore, was subsumed within the broader Conservative party
defence of traditional British institutions, even though it did not square well with the
preferences of some of the Peelites’ constituents. But, once voting for protection no longer
served the Peelites’ desire for party unity – as Peel’s support for Repeal in 1846 foreclosed
this outcome – their voting behaviour reflected their interest in more closely representing
their constituents’ preferences. For Peelites, this meant that protection ceased to form part
of the bundle of traditional British institutions. In brief, the Conservative party was an
TABLE 1 Association Between MP Party Affiliation and District Type
Non-Peelite Whigs/
District type Conservatives Peelites Liberals Reformers Total
County 140 14 21 5 180
(50.9%) (15.4%) (14.0%) (6.8%) (30.5%)
Borough 135 77 129 69 410
(49.1%) (84.6%) (86.0%) (93.2%) (69.5%)
Total 275 91 150 74 590
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
44 McLean, ‘Interests and Ideology’.
45 The differences in means for McLean’s three revised Canada Wheat scales are significant at the 5 per cent
level, while those for his remaining revised scales are significant at the 1 per cent level.
46 Regressing the two blocks of Conservatives on four constituency interests variables obtains a weak but
significant correlation. All the predictors except electoral reform are significant at 1 per cent and, overall, the model
correctly predicts 75 per cent of the cases.
47 Their voting behaviour on trade policy up to 1846 could even be described as adhering to a sense of ‘false
consciousness’ (K. Bawn, ‘Constructing “Us”: Ideology, Coalition Politics, and False Consciousness’, American
Journal of Political Science, 43 (1999), 303–34).
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TABLE 2 Association Between MP Party Affiliation and District Economic
Orientation
District economic Non-Peelite Whigs/
orientation Conservatives Peelites Liberals Reformers Total
Most protectionist 106 11 18 6 141
(38.5%) (12.1%) (12.0%) (8.1%) (23.9%)
Protectionist oriented 116 50 67 30 263
(42.2%) (54.9%) (44.7%) (40.5%) (44.6%)
Neutral or mixed 33 20 32 19 104
(12.0%) (22.0%) (21.3%) (25.7%) (17.6%)
Free-trade oriented 14 8 20 12 54
(5.1%) (8.8%) (13.3%) (16.2%) (9.2%)
Most free trade 6 2 13 7 28
(2.2%) (2.2%) (8.7%) (9.5%) (4.7%)
Total 275 91 150 74 590
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
ideological coalition that cut across two distinct interests-based alliances, and so was
inherently unstable.
INTERESTS IN AN IDEOLOGICAL PARLIAMENT
In spite of a seemingly impressive ability to classify MPs’ votes, the NOMINATE
technique suffers from a number of problems in this context. First, while spatial positions
revealed by NOMINATE are the product of votes by MPs on all divisions over the duration
of the parliament, they provide no information on why MPs voted as they did. We know
that their votes reveal a pattern but we do not know what explains the pattern of the first
dimension. It is tempting to suggest that it must reflect the major conflict of the parliament,
namely trade policy. But that is not enough: the aim here is to identify separately the
contributions to explaining that pattern from MPs’ ideology, party affiliation and
constituency interests. To do this requires more detailed analysis to sort out the appropriate
weights for these three influences.
Dissecting Interests, Party and MP Ideology: The ‘Errors’
A very simple way to begin to identify the role for constituency interests in the critical
Repeal division of 1846 is to study those seventeen MPs whose votes could not be correctly
classified (by a one-dimensional NOMINATE model). Table 3 lists the seventeen MPs,
along with their constituency, party affiliation, first dimension coordinate and four
indicators of constituency economic composition. The first two indicators are measures
of portfolio diversification by landowners, based on death duty registers and income tax
return schedules. The greater the diversification, the more likely the MP was to vote for
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repeal.48 The other two, district type and district economic orientation, are the same
variables presented in Tables 1 and 2.
The errors in the upper section of Table 3 are protectionist MPs. According to a spatial
model, they should have voted for free trade but failed to do so in 1846. Conversely, the
errors in the lower section are free traders – but were designated as protectionists by their
other votes in the 1841–47 Parliament. Comparing the means of the first dimension scores,
we can see that the protectionist MPs averaged a considerably higher score than did the
free traders – which is, of course, another way of illustrating the errors in predicting these
votes. Notably, the protectionist errors are on average further from the cut point (i.e., the
point that divides the Yea and the Nay votes) than the free trade errors – that is, they are
‘bigger’ errors. Yet the means of all four economic interest variables would place each
group in the correct voting camp: the average scores for the free traders are all larger than
those for the protectionists, which is what an economic interest model would predict.
Because the groups are very small, we cannot say that the means are statistically
significant49 – however, as the story is consistent across all four variables, we can conclude
that there is some further support for the role of constituency economic interests affecting
the votes of these MPs.
Dissecting Interests, Party and MP Ideology: The Schism between Non-Peelites and
Peelites
The model presented earlier provides a more comprehensive way to assess the extent to
which MPs voted as trustees and/or delegates.50 Equations 1 and 2 dissect the first
dimension coordinate into three variables – constituency interests, party and MP ideology.
Figure 3 provides density plots of these three variables, along with the original
Fig. 3. First dimension coordinate separated into interests, party and (new) ideology
48 Schonhardt-Bailey, ‘Specific Factors’.
49 A simple test of means finds that just the death duty diversification variable is statistically significant at 1
per cent.
50 Four other models of parliamentary voting were tested. For details, see author’s personal website.
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first dimension coordinate. The bi-modal distribution of the first dimension coordinate
reflects the two major-party divisions, with Conservatives on the left and Liberals on the
right (as seen in Figure 1). Constituency interests is a more dispersed measure, but
nonetheless illustrates a prominent clustering of free-trade oriented interests towards the
right side of the graph. The party variable simply illustrates the four party subgroups (as
components of the first dimension coordinate). Most revealing, MP ideology, once stripped
of interests and party, begins to resemble a normal distribution, albeit with a negative skew.
While it is tempting simply to assume that this residual term provides an adequate measure
of MP personal ideology, it remains a logical possibility that it may be a consequence rather
than a determinant of votes in parliament (and therefore cannot be considered to be
exogenous in a model of voting behaviour). It is also conceivable that this variable reflects
the pattern of ideological consistency imposed by the national parties. While it may be
impossible to say with absolute certainty that this variable is an acceptable proxy for MP
ideology, Figures 4, 5, and 6 help to clarify that this variable does indeed appear to measure
a normal left–right ideological continuum, with left leaning towards free trade and right
leaning towards protection.51
Figures 4 and 5 are density plots of MP ideology, with groupings for district type and
district economic orientation. Both plots tell the same story: MPs from rural, agricultural
districts (which opposed repeal most stridently) were to the ‘right’ in their ideological
orientation, while MPs from districts with more urban/industrial interests (which viewed
Repeal more favourably) were near to the centre, or slightly left of centre in their
Fig. 4. New MP ideology by district type
51 Hence, MP ideology differs from the first dimension coordinate in Figures 1 and 2, where parties situated
towards one end of the spectrum supported protection and those to the other supported free trade. This
transformation of the ideological spectrum is a feature of stripping the party component from the first dimension
coordinate in order to arrive at a ‘purer’ measure of MP ideology.
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Fig. 5. New MP ideology by district economic orientation
Fig. 6. New MP ideology by party affiliation
ideological orientation. That this measure coincides with the interests of constituents
should be no surprise, as others have found that constituents tended to select like-minded
MPs, and MPs, in turn, tended to select constituencies in which they could win.52 Of
52 Cox, The Efficient Secret, p. 151.
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particular interest is the distinctly right of centre position of MPs from highly protectionist
districts (Figure 5). From Table 2, we know that the vast majority of these MPs were also
non-Peelites. In contrast, MPs from protectionist-oriented and neutral districts – many of
whom were Peelites – tended to be positioned at the centre or slightly to the left of centre.
Figure 6 is also a density plot of MPs’ ideology, but with party groupings. We see an
ideological distinction between non-Peelites and Peelites, which undermines an interpret-
ation of the residual as measuring the ideological consistency imposed by the Conservative
party. Figure 6, moreover, provides an illustration of the core argument of this article. The
Conservative party was a coalition of two distinct interests-based factions. While the
Peelites shared the general ideology of the Conservative party (represented in Figure 6 as
overlapping ideological space with the non-Peelites), they formed a distinct (left of centre)
subset, which in turn was aligned with the interests of their constituents. Prior to 1846, their
protectionist votes conflicted with a personal ideology that coincided more with
constituents’ interests. Meanwhile, the non-Peelite Conservatives, positioned to the right
of centre, faced no such conflict between personal ideology and constituents’ interests.
Finally, it is worth noting a comparison between Figures 2 and 6.53 In Figure 2, ideology,
partisanship and constituency interests are intertwined, whereas in Figure 6, the effects of
partisanship and constituency interests on the first dimension coordinate have been
extracted, leaving what appears to be a purer measure of MPs’ ideology. Figure 6 reveals,
moreover, that MPs’ ideology appeared to share a considerable amount of common space.
Yet, even in this common space, Peelites retained a distinct ideological identity.
Regression Analysis of Repeal Votes
From the model displayed earlier, we obtain our three key predictors of the Repeal
legislation – constituency interests, party and MPs’ ideology. To these predictors I add the
second dimension coordinate from NOMINATE, as a way to test for the robustness of the
key variables. Table 4 presents the results of logistic regressions for annual votes on Repeal
leading up to and including the final vote in 1846.54 For the final Repeal vote, the model
correctly predicts all but five of the votes of the Peelites, which is no small task.55 What
is more intriguing is that MPs’ ideology appears to have had little or no bearing on the
Repeal vote, while constituency interests, party and the second dimension coordinate56 are
all significant at 1 per cent.
53 Figure 6 resembles more closely a traditional left–right ideological continuum, while Figure 2 reflects more
the partisan component of the first dimension coordinate.
54 A model that follows the Kalt and Zupan method (by including party affiliation in the first and only regression)
obtains the same overall percentage correctly predicted as Model 4 (discussed on the author’s personal website),
and results in no errors for the observed Yeas and eight for the observed Nays. This model was, however, considered
inappropriate for reasons discussed above.
55 Data limitations described earlier mean that this model actually explains seventy-seven of the eighty-two
Peelites for whom I have data (see author’s personal website).
56 At first glance, the statistical significance of the second dimension coordinate is puzzling, as it clearly lessens
the predictive success of the model in 1846 (the one-dimensional model misclassifies seventeen votes – with a
PRE of 0.905 – while the two-dimensional model misclassifies twenty-two votes – with a PRE of 0.877). It is
important, then, to ask whether there is a causal relationship between the apparent split between Peelites and
non-Peelite Conservatives on the second dimension and the split on Repeal. In a nutshell, the answer is yes, but
the direction of causality runs from the split on Repeal to the split on the second dimension. That is, hostility
towards Repeal shaped the cleavage on the second dimension, not vice versa. For further discussion, see the
author’s personal website.
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The very strong performance of constituency interests and party in predicting the Repeal
vote does not, however, suggest that MPs’ ideology had no role to play in the progression
to Repeal. From previous divisions on Repeal, we see a very dramatic shift in the role of
MPs’ ideology in 1846. From 1842 to 1845, the ideology of MPs is highly significant (at
1 per cent in 1843–45 and 5 per cent in 1842), as too are all the remaining variables except
the second dimension coordinate. As a model, the variables explain 98–99 per cent of the
Repeal votes. This suggests that the portions of the first dimension coordinate that can be
attributed to (a) constituency interests, (b) party, and (c) MPs’ ideology, all carried weight
in the voting decisions of MPs, until the actual Repeal vote. In 1846, an abrupt change
occurred: MPs’ personal ideology appears to have had little or no influence in their
decision. Rather, they were motivated more by the desire to further their constituents’
interests. Repeal appears to have gained passage as (at least some) MPs switched from
voting as trustees to voting as delegates.
The coefficient estimates from Table 4 may be used to conduct simulations that allow
us to estimate the substantive effect of changes in key variables – particularly, constituency
interests and MPs’ ideology – on the simulated probability of a free-trade vote. Using the
parameters from the logistic regressions from Table 4, 1,000 simulated sets of parameters
are generated.57 From these, two probabilities are calculated for each of the key variables,
creating a set of probabilities for each faction of the Conservative party. The first is the
probability of a vote in favour of free trade when MPs’ ideology and the second dimension
coordinate are set to their mean values, constituency interests is set to its minimum value,
and the party variable is set equal to Peelite. This simulates the probability of a Peelite from
a highly rural constituency (whose ideology and second dimension coordinate values are
considered average) voting for free trade. The second simulates the change that results in
the first set of probabilities when constituency interests is changed to its maximum value.
This allows us to compare the probability of a free-trade vote from a Peelite representing
a rural constituency with one representing an industrial, export-oriented district (all else
held constant). Similarly, the probability of a free-trade vote is calculated for a Peelite
whose ideology falls at the extreme left of the spectrum, with the remaining variables
(constituency interests and second dimension coordinate) set at their mean values. As with
constituency interests, a second probability then simulates the change that results when we
consider a Peelite whose ideology falls at the extreme right of the spectrum (all else held
constant). This same set of probabilities is replicated, but for the non-Peelite faction of the
Conservative party. For simplicity, probabilities from just the early division and the final
division are considered, with the results given in Table 5.58
From Table 5 we can see that, over the whole of the parliament, constituency interests
and personal ideology weighed more heavily for Peelites than non-Peelites (as the
differences in all the probabilities are greater for non-Peelites). This suggests that
non-Peelites were driven more by the broader Conservative ideology (which viewed
protection as a traditional British institution) than were Peelites, which is consistent with
the argument of this article. Nonetheless, constituency interests and personal ideology also
affected the votes of non-Peelites, but more so in 1842 than in 1846. In 1842, both variables
57 G. King, M. Tomz and J. Wittenberg, ‘Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation
and Presentation’, American Journal of Political Science, 44 (2000), 347–61; M. Tomz, J. Wittenberg and G. King,
CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results, Version 2.0 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University, 2001) (http://gking.harvard.edu).
58 The interpretations of the probabilities given below are consistent with those of the omitted years.
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generate an increase in the probability of a free-trade vote of about 0.77, while in 1846,
constituency interests generates an increase of just 0.32 and personal ideology a minuscule
(and statistically insignificant) 0.03. It seems fair to say, then, that in the final 1846 vote,
non-Peelites were affected in part by constituency interests but not at all by personal
ideology.
For Peelites, it is clear that constituency interests had a very strong effect on voting
behaviour for the duration of the parliament. Changing the orientation of the district from
rural to industrial increases the probability of a Peelite voting for free trade from virtually
zero to almost one. In contrast, the effect of ideology is very strong in 1842 (with a change
from its minimum to its maximum value resulting in an increase in the probability of a
free-trade vote from almost zero to almost one), but weak (and statistically insignificant)
in 1846. This provides firm evidence in support of the contention that, as the influence of
ideology dissipated in 1846, Peelites voted more as delegates.
MPS’ IDEOLOGY: SHIRKING OR REPUTATION BUILDING?
A lively and on-going debate in the legislative studies literature contrasts ‘bad’ ideology
with ‘good’ ideology.59 For some, legislators who serve their own ideological preferences
instead of the preferences of their constituents are labelled as (bad) ‘shirkers’.60 For others,
ideology serves a (good) reputational purpose inasmuch as legislators who vote against
their established (ideologically based) reputations do themselves a disservice by devaluing
that reputation.61 This study provides some insights into the strengths and limitations of
both interpretations of ideology by providing a relatively simple case with which to explore
the interplay between ideology and constituency interests.
The case of mid-nineteenth century Britain is unusual in that it is one of the few examples
of a political environment in which a single issue is dominant. Politics in the 1840s most
definitely revolved around trade policy: the election of 1841 was characterized largely as
a mandate on trade policy (with the Conservative party standing for protection); the
overriding issue of the 1841–47 Parliament was the Corn Laws; and Repeal caused the
ultimate demise of the Peel government and the disintegration of the Conservative party.
This single-issue dominance allows us to simplify the interests of constituents according
to their preferences on trade policy (as, for example, in Table 2). Let us further assume
that the trade policy preference of the median voter can be defined by an aggregate measure,
derived from ‘district economic orientation’ (from Table 2).62
It is almost certain that the median voter in non-Peelite Conservative constituencies
favoured protection. This means that non-Peelite Conservatives were not ‘shirkers’, as they
consistently voted for protection throughout the parliament. However, these MPs were also
59 Richardson and Munger, ‘Shirking, Representation and Congressional Behavior’.
60 Peltzman, ‘Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting’; D. Nelson and E. Silberberg, ‘Ideology and
Legislator Shirking’, Economic Inquiry, 25 (1987), 15–25.
61 Dougan and Munger, ‘The Rationality of Ideology’; Richardson and Munger, ‘Shirking, Representation and
Congressional Behavior’.
62 This sets aside differences between the geographic constituency and the election constituency (R. F. Fenno,
Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1978); Uslaner, The Movers and
the Shirkers), as well as questions arising from the limited franchise. Aggregate measures of constituency interests
include those of the disenfranchised, and if these were found to differ from those of the franchised, may introduce
a bias to the measurement of constituency interests. Such a bias is, however, unlikely as the interests of the
disenfranchised (which include free-trade-oriented industrial workers and protectionist-oriented rural labourers)
may very well simply mirror those of the franchised (namely industrial capitalists and landowners).
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wedded to a Conservative ideology in which protection was considered a fundamental
British institution. And, moreover, the Conservative party’s reputation for defending
protection was critical to the 1841 election. It is, therefore, impossible to be certain about
what motivated the protectionist votes of non-Peelite Conservatives, as a Conservative
ideology and constituency interests point in the same direction. Moreover, a concern for
maintaining their reputations as true defenders of ‘Conservatism’ may have figured in the
1846 vote, as these MPs saw their leader and the rest of their party defect to free trade.
In short, these MPs may have been voting as simple delegates for the duration of the
parliament, or may have been motivated by a broader Conservative ideology. What is very
clear is that they were not shirking.
The preference of the median voter in Peelite constituencies is less certain, but in all
likelihood was borderline protectionist, with some leanings towards free-trade. As such,
it is a stretch to characterize a free-trade vote in 1846 as ‘shirking’. Indeed, the notion of
shirking is virtually meaningless in a context of a median voter who is situated very near
(if not at) the point of indifference. But to characterize Peelite voting as reputation building
is no more helpful, as an ideological reputation suggests constancy in voting – not an abrupt
reversal. The most appropriate interpretation of Peelite voting behaviour (subject to the
limitations of econometric testing)63 is as described earlier, that before 1846, Peelites voted
according to a general Conservative ideology, but in 1846 their votes reflected a median
voter who was leaning towards free trade.
Finally, this case points to two general limitations of both the shirking and
reputation-building interpretations of ideology. First, neither interpretation is conducive
to an understanding of why legislators abruptly change their votes. In the case of Repeal,
the source of change stemmed from the instability inherent in a Conservative party that,
while sharing a general Conservative ideology, was the marriage of two distinct
interests-based alliances. That is, Peelite conversion to free trade came from a conflict
between a Conservative ideology and constituents’ interests which eventually erupted
when their leader moved for Repeal. Without examining how interests intersect with
ideology it is impossible to understand an abrupt reversal such as Repeal. Hence, where
the task is to explain shifts in voting patterns (particularly for issues such as trade policy
where interests are highly charged), a focus strictly on ideology (defined either as shirking
or reputation-building) has severe limitations.
Secondly, the quantity measure of shirking suggested by Kalt and Zupan – namely, the
absolute value of the ideology residual – can result in misleading findings where the
direction of interests is of fundamental importance. Comparing this measure across party
groups, it appears that non-Peelite Conservatives demonstrated far more shirking than
Peelites, Whigs/Liberals and Reformers, as we obtain measures of shirking for each party
group of 0.235, 0.144, 0.141 and 0.139, respectively. This would suggest that non-Peelite
Conservatives were even more protectionist than their constituents desired, while the rest
were more closely aligned with the interests of their constituents. In Kalt and Zupan’s view,
63 The motivations of MPs are invariably difficult to capture from roll-call analysis. Ideally, researchers would
use content analysis to evaluate the written and verbal explanations given by MPs for their positions. While these
too may have their own limitations, the combination of roll-call analysis and content analysis should provide a
better understanding of the motivations of MPs as they face the cross-pressures of constituency interests and
ideology. Indeed, very recent content analysis of the 1841–47 Parliamentary Debates reveals that the arguments
that Peelites invoked to explain their votes did indeed change abruptly in 1846 (C. Schonhardt-Bailey,
‘Conservatives Who Sounded Like Trustees But Voted Like Delegates’ (unpublished, London School of
Economics, 2002, posted on the author’s website)). The content of this change is entirely consistent with the
argument set forth in this article.
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non-Peelites should therefore have lost electoral support as a consequence of their shirking.
But, in fact, non-Peelite Conservatives were marginally more successful than Peelites in
the general election of 1847,64 which suggests that non-Peelites may even have gained
support from maintaining their protectionist reputation. Hence, such a simple quantitative
measure of shirking can, in cases where extreme views are likely to generate support,
mislead. Thus, if we accept that non-Peelite Conservativs were shirking, the presumption
that shirking is an electoral liability would require reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
This article has sought to answer the puzzle of the Peelites by characterizing the
Conservative party as a coalition between two interests-based alliances, with a shared
concern for retaining traditional British institutions. Non-Peelite Conservatives, who
represented mostly agricultural districts, had no motivation to follow Prime Minister Peel
as he moved for Repeal: both their Conservatism and representation of rural constituencies
pointed towards retaining a firm commitment to protection. Peelites, who represented
districts with comparatively more free-trade leaning interests, faced a conflict between
their concern for Conservatism and their representation of constituents who were either
borderline protectionists or leaning towards free trade. Prior to 1846, they voted in
accordance with Conservatism. But in 1846, when their leader foreclosed the option of
retaining party unity, Peelites shifted from voting as trustees to voting more as delegates.
More broadly, this article has sought to develop a methodological framework for
disentangling the influences of constituency interests, party and personal ideology on the
roll-call votes of legislators. It applies widely recognized (though not necessarily
universally accepted) methodologies such as the NOMINATE technique and the Kalt and
Zupan residualization approach in a way that allows us to gauge the relative influences of
interests, party and ideology on MPs in the votes leading up to and including the final third
reading of Repeal. Yet, as the British case and its data are obviously historical, one might
question whether the analysis presented here is generalizable to other, more contemporary
legislative settings. Certainly, nineteenth-century British parties were less cohesive and
constituency interests were less complex than in contemporary Britain – but these are only
differences of degree. And, certainly, the historical setting made the ideological climate
in 1846 unique – but not so much as to prevent contemporary observers from drawing
parallels between intra-Conservative party cleavages on Repeal with those on the European
Union. Moreover, this article has shown that the ideological make-up of the 1841–47
Parliament can be largely understood within a contemporary left–right continuum. Hence,
just as other non-American applications of the NOMINATE method have demonstrated,65
while legislative settings may differ considerably, the methodologies applied to study them
have much in common.
What remains certain is that the findings of this article call into question some of the
64 In a cross-tabulation of party affiliation and the electoral fate of MPs in the 1847 election, 49 per cent of
non-Peelite Conservatives were returned to parliament (with or without a contest) while 45 per cent of Peelites
were similarly returned. And similarly, where a contest occurred, 67 per cent of non-Peelites won while 64 per
cent of Peelites won.
65 S. Hix, ‘Nations vs Parties vs Ideology: Voting Behavior in the European Parliament, 1994–2000’ (paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 2000); A.
Noury, ‘Ideology, Nationality, and Euro-Parliamentarians’ (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 2000); Voeten, ‘Clashes in the Assembly’.
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historiography of nineteenth-century trade policy which tends to view the conversion to
Repeal by Peelites as a statement of independence from party and constituents; rather, the
message here is that Peelites shifted their votes in order to match more closely the free-trade
leaning preferences of their constituents. The findings also point to the need to understand
the interplay between ideology, party and interests as motivations for roll-call voting
behaviour. The progression to Repeal, and indeed Repeal itself, cannot be understood
without reference to all three influences.
